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LIABILITY OF A TRUSTEE: BALANCING GAINS
AGAINST LOSSES
By BENJAmIN HAR-RIS, JR.*
"A trustee who is liable for a loss occasioned by a breach of trust
with respect to one portion of the trust property cannot reduce the
amount of his liability by deducting the amount of a gain which has
accrued with respect to another part of the trust property through
another and distinct breach of trust.
"Thus, if the trustee improperly invests part of the trust funds in
securities he sells at a profit and improperly invests another part of
the trust funds in other securities which he sells at a loss, the bene-
ficiary can accept the securities on which there was a loss; he can
compel the trustee to account for the profit on the former securities
and charge the trustee with the loss on the latter securities.
"Illustration: A is trustee of $10,000 for B. By the terms of the
trust A Is directed to invest the money in bonds. A invests $5,000 in
shares of the X Company and $5,000 in shares of the Y Company. The
shares of the X Company become valueless and the shares of the Y
Company rise in value and A sells them for $10,000. B can charge
A with $5,000 and interest for the breach of trust in purchasing shares
of the X Company, and hold A accountable for the proceeds of the
shares of the Y Company.":'
A personally bears a loss of $5,000; B gains $5,000, a sur-
plus above the fund the law seeks to secure to him. What is
the basis of A's liability, the policy of imposing such a burden
on him? By well settled rules, from the time A made the im-
proper investment, A has been personally liable for the full
$10,000 with interest; for the shares of X and Y purchased; or
for any particular bonds he should have purchased. Why.the
further liability? The text-writers do little more than announce
the broad rule set out in the first paragraph quoted above, citing
as authorities cases which are generally inapposite.2
The origin of the rule against allowing set-off of gains
against losses seems to have been in the combining of two prin-
* Assistant Counsel, National Recovery Administration. B. S.,
Harvard; LL. B., Harvard; member of the Massachusetts Bar.
'American Law Institute: Restatement of Trusts, Tentative Draft
No. 3, sec. 204.
2 Lewin on Trusts, 13 ed., p. 954; Perry on Trusts, 7 ed., sec. 847.
Authorities cited: Wiles v. Gresham, 2 Drew. 258 (1854), involving a
proper and an improper investment; Re Barker, 77 L. T. (N. S.) 712
(1898), a supporting decision which does not advert to the point;
letcher v. Green, 33 Beav. 426 (1864) a contrary decision; Dimes v.
,Scott, 4 Russ. 195 (1828), a payment to a life tenant instead of to the
succeeding beneficiary; Palmer v. Jones, 1 Vern. 144 (1682), not in
point.
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ciples of law: A trustee is liable for losses from unauthorized
investments; and, a trustee is not allowed to make personal
profit out of the trust; and arriving at a broad principle which
was applied to cases where in fact there had been no net loss
to the estate, nor personal profit to the trustee.3 This formula-
tion and application of the rule is still followed. 4 In Cuyter's
Estate that result was based on a supposititious case which the
court should have distinguished from the case before it. The
court argues :5
"Now, if, in the present case, the trustee is permitted to set off
the gains which he has made in certain non-legal investments against
the losses which he has incurred in others, that would be nothing else
but his making a profit out of his dealings with property which is
not his own. I can see no difference between putting the profits in his
own pocket and using them to defray his debts. It seems to me to
be inconsistent to maintain that the consequences of one unauthorized
act should be mitigated by the more fortunate results of another, and
if we consider the case from the standpoint of public policy, on which
all these principles ultimately rest, this conclusion is greatly strength-
ened, for if a trustee who has made an unauthorized and losing in-
vestment knows that he may recoup the loss by better luck in another,
he would certainly be tempted to embark on another enticing specula-
tion, which, as holding out a prospective profit, would be attended
with further and perhaps even greater risk to the trust funds."
On the facts of such a case, one should agree with the result.
It is not clear in Cityler's Estate, when the various investments
were made, but it is quite as likely that the unprofitable invest-
ments were made at the same time or after the profitable ones.
In such case there was no loss to be recouped by the trustee and
no profiting by the improper investment to which the court's
argument of deterrence could be applied. The courts have lost.
sight of a sharp line of distinction, that between a case in which
the trustee in good faith errs in the investment or retention of
securities, and a case like the one imagined by this court, where-
in the trustee willfully or carelessly subjects the trust fund to
further risk. This distinction will be shown later to divide the
cases in which set-off should or should not be allowed.
In Creed v. MeAleey,0 the rule is arrived at by stating that
'Hypothetical Case of Restatement, supra; Adye v. Feuimleteau,
3 Swanst. 84 n, 1 Cox Eq. 24 (1783); Creed v. McAleer, 275 Mass. 353,
175 N. E. 761 (1931); Cuyler's Estate, 5 D. & C. (Pa.) 317 (1924).
4 Cuyler's Estate, supra, note 3; similarly, Creed v. McAteer, supra,
note 3.
5 Ctyler's Estate, supra, note 3; similar approach in Gillespie V.
Brooks, 2 Redf. Surr. (N.'Y.) 349 (1876).
0 Supra, note 3.
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the gain in each investment belongs to the trust estate, and that
in no way can a trustee reap a personal profit from it, citing two
cases in which a trustee actually -attempted to make personal
profits for himself,7 by purchasing land for his own benefit, and
taking dividends from stock purchased with trust funds, re-
spectively. In the next sentence, without citing any authorities
(nor were there any cited in the briefs) : "A trustee cannot off-
set a loss for which he is liable for a gain belonging not to him
but to the cestui que trust", failing to see that there was clearly
unjust enrichment of the trustee in the two cases cited, while
there was a loss in the case before the court. The trustee has
had no opportunity to profit, since he is governed by the first
rule stated by the court. It is only by an argument assuming
the rule against set-off that one can aver that the trustee has a
loss which he might avoid by a set-off of the profitable invest-
ments. In our principal hypothetical case, if the trustee were
to account for $10,000, he would not lave profited in the sense
of the cases cited to sustain ithe rule against set-off, nor in any
true sense.
Another argument for the rule against set-off proceeds on
an analogy to the agency doctrine of affirmation of an agent's
unauthorized act.8 A principal may affirm one transaction and
disaffirm another so long as they are separate and distinct trans-
actions. The emphasis and endeavor of the Restatement of Trusts
'Bowen v. Richardson, 133 Mass. 293 (1880); BaZl v. Hopkins, 268
Mdass. 260, 167 N. E. 338 (1929).
8 See King v. Talbot, 40 N. Y. 76 (1869): "The rule is perfectly well-
settled, that a cestui que trust is at liberty to elect to approve an
unauthorized investment, and enjoy its profits, or to reject it at his
option; and I perceive no reason for saying that, where the trustee
has divided the fund into parts and made separate investments, the
cestui que trust is not at liberty, on equitable as well as legal grounds,
to approve and adopt such as he thinks it foi his interest to approve.
The money invested is his money; and in respect to each and every
dollar, it seems to me, he has an unqualified right to follow it, and
claim the fruits of its investment, and that the trustee cannot deny it.
The fact that the trustee has made other investments of other parts of
the fund, which the cestui que trust is not bound to approve, and dis-
affirms, cannot, I think, affect the power. For example suppose in
the present case, the cestui que trust, on delivery to him of all the
securities and bonds in which his legacy had appeared invested, had
declared: Although these investments are improperly made, not in
accordance with the intent of the testator, nor in the due performance
of your duty, I waive all the objection on that account, except as to
the stock of the S. & W. R. R. Co. That, I reject, and return to you.
It is doubtful, that his position must be sustained?"
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to set out what is and what is not a distinct breach of trust6
would suggest that this analogy accounts for its rule. There
seems to be little doubt that, by the set legal principles of agency,
if I send my agent to the store with two nickels to buy two
lemons, and he comes back having purchased, at five cents each,
one fine orange worth ten cents, and a rotten worthless orange,
I can affirm the former purchase, and require the return of my
other nickel by disaffirming the latter. It is a result which
might be understood as ensuing from following to a logical con-
clusion the crystalized technical conceptions of the law, but not
one in consonance with the spirit of equity, with its hesitancy at
inflicting undue hardship and its principle against unjust en-
richment. Further, if one would argue the point from a technical
standpoint, it has often been pointed out that a trustee is ordi-
narily not the agent of the cestui que trust.1 .0  Moreover, the
rules for ratification of an unauthorized act have been strictly
construed, requiring the presence of certain elements in the
situation. 1 Among these elements, in the trust situation, the
following are lacking: the principal must have present ability
to do the act himself or to authorize it to be done;12 the act
ratified must have been done by the assumed agent as agent,
not as a principal;13 and he must, according to the weight of
authority, have professed to act for a principal.14
Some cases have intimated that, although there could be no
ratification, there could be an "adoption" of the transaction.
"The chief difficulty," says Mechem,15 "in the way of accept-
ance of this doctrine of adoption, rather than ratification of the
Supra, sec. 204.
' Restatement of Trusts, Tentative Draft No. 1, sec. 11; Taylor v.
Davis, 110 U. S. 330 (1884); Hartley v. Phillips, 198 Pa. 9, 47 Atl. 929(1901); Mechem on Agency, 2 ed., sees. 42, 43.
n Mechem, supra, secs. 376 et seq.
"McCracken v. San Francisco, 16 Cal. 591, 624 (1860).
"13Merritt v. Kewanee, 175 Ill. 537, 548, 51 N. E. 867 (1898).
2'Ferris v. Snow, 130 Mich. 254, 90 N. W. 850 (1902).
IsSupra, sec. 382; see also: 2fcArthur v. Times Printing Co., 48
Minn. 319, 51 N. W. 216 (1892)* I. re Empress Eng. Co.. 16 Ch. Div.
125 (1880); Falke v. Ins. Co., 34 Ch. Div. 234, 249 (1886)-"There is
nothing more vague than the way in which the word 'adoption' is used
in arguments at law and sometimes ambiguous language used about
adoption is imported into arguments about ratification. There is no
such thing as adopting or ratifying anything except where there is
the sanction of an act professedly done on your behalf in such a case
as to make you liable for it. A man can ratify that which purports
to be done for him, but he cannot ratify a thing which purports to be
K. L. J.-10
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contract, lies in the fact that there seems not to be any such
doctrine known to our law." There could, of course, be an
acceptance of a continuing offer, a new contract, or a novation
where there is no ratification possible, but such cannot be found
in the facts of the cases of trustees discussed. It is conceded
that in many cases, if the cestui que trust is sui juris, he can
consent and take the benefit of a trustee's unauthorized act.
This consent, however, should not be taken'as a power that the
cestui que trust can exercise over the trustee to profit at the
latter's expenie, but rather to exculpate the trustee and permit
him to hold the securities without liability. It is in the nature
of an estoppel, estopping the cestui que trust from denying the
trustee's authority. An estoppel cannot be used affirmatively
by the person estopped; it is restrictive, not enabling.
So far, an attempt has been made to show the basis or ration-
ale on which the rule against setting off gains against losses was
formulated and followed. Its history, and the incongruity of
this penalty to other current law governing trustees who have
acted bona fide but in breach of trust, offer further arguments
against it. The rule was accepted and followed in England in
1783,16 although the court at that date recognized it as incurring
hardship. The court said, "The executor has behaved very hon-
ourably; and I do not doubt that when the infants come of age,
they will think themselves bound in honour to make .up this
loss to him." Subsequent cases have only reluctantly applied
the rule.IT By statute in England, if it appears to the court
that a trustee is or may be personally liable for a breach of trust,
but has acted honestly and reasonably and ought fairly to be
excused for the breach of trust, the court may relieve him wholly
or partly from liability for the same. s Under this statute,
trustees who have incurred losses in investments outside the
terms of their trusts, have been excused from liability therefor. 19
Note that the rule against set-off often loads on a trustee a
liabilify where there has been no actual loss to the estate, or a
done for someone else. Ratification takes effect in law from its being
equivalent to previous authority, and a previous authority is an in-
cident which only arises in the relation of principal and agent."16 Adye v. Feuilleteau, supra, note 3.
"Robinson v. Robinson, 11 Beav. 371 (1848); In Re Deare, 11
T. L. R. 183 (1895).
I Judicial Trustees Act, 1896, 59 & 60 Vict., cap. 35, Sec. 3.
"Perrins v. Bellamy (1899), 1 Ch. 797; In Re Grindley (1898), 2
Ch. 593.
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liability greater than the loss to the estate, a more stringent
rule than that contemplated and abated by the English statute.
The tendency of the English Courts as well as the legis-
lature has been one of increasing leniency toward trustees in
such situations. Story remarked on the rigorous treatment ac-
corded trustees.2 0 Later a more understanding and charitable
attitude was noted by the late Augustine Birrell,2 1 who at-
tributed the change in the courts' attitude to the change in
equity procedure. When questions were decided on affidavits
in the absence of the suitors, chancellors dispassionately applied
the strict rules to the facts. When presentation of evidence be-
came oral, and the trustee appeared with his obvious good in-
tent, innocence, and shortcomings, the court grew more sympa-
thetic. In an opinion under the Judicial Trustees Act, reliev-
ing a trustee of liability, for loss of income from improperly
handling trust property, Rigby, L. J., gives another explana-
tion:2 2
"I remember well in my early days cases in which, there having
been inadvertent breaches of trust involving no moral blame, the
conseluences were visited on trustees. It was said, 'The Court of
Chancery was open to you, and if you chose to incur the risk of going
on without asking the direction of the Court, you must take the con-
sequences.' That was the only excuse that I can remember for the
extremely hard orders against trustees, and it shocked one's conscience.
Now all that has been altered. A trustee is not now entitled, as of
course, to get the direction of the Court. He cannot get rid of his
responsibility. He cannot, except at the risk of having to pay the
costs of the proceedings, approach the Court at all. That is such a
change that no possible excuse has been left for those old decisions
which operated so hardly in many cases upon trustees."
Thus a relinquishment of the peremptory treatment of trustees
has evolved from the time when the rule against set-off vfas
formulated. It would be consistent with the evolution to re-
consider the harsh rule which survives.
How does the rule against set-off compare with rules in
similar situations and fit in the general policy of the law of
trustees' liability? If one dismisses the bases for the rule sug-
gested above, one may still feel that the rule is justifiable to
secure strict observance of the terms of the trust by the trustee.
Still considering the situation presented in the principal hypo-
',Story: Equity Jurisprudence, 14 Am. ed., sec. 1681.
"' The Duties and Liabilities of Trustees, London, 120, p. 13 et seq.
2'Perrins v. Bellamy (1899), 1 Ch. 797, 801; to the same effect,
Re Roberts, 76 L. T. R. (N. S.) 479, 484 (1897).
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thetical case, the one real danger against which the law should
provide, is the risk of loss to the istate through improper in-
vestment and the inability to recover from the trustee because
of his lack of assets. A New Jersey case23 precisely outlines the
problem-the risk incurred only when the trustee is insolvent.
It held the trustee subject to a surcharge for losses to the trust
from his breach of trust, but refused to withhold his commis-
sion, saying:
"It is, of course, true that a general rule of law applies alike to
those possessed of small means as well as those possessed of large, but
it is equally true that where a trustee is possessed of very large
resources, as this trustee is, and therefore nothing that it has done
could possibly jeopardize the interests of the cestui que trust, and the
latter would, in every event, receive all that the court found due to
them, a different situation exists-than if a trustee of meagre resources
should make unauthorized investments and thereby jeopardize the
Interests of the cestui que trust, and make it possible that they would
lose what ought to come to them."
This risk should be forestalled by the law. In the case where
funds are invested simultaneously in different securities in-
nocently, the question resolves itself into how great a penalty
should be exacted. As already stated, the trustee cannot per-
sonally profit from unauthorized investments. He will be liable
for the loss on unauthorized investments. To a trustee aware
of these terms there is no inducement to misinvest. If the trustee
is ignorant of the limits of the trust or of the law, a stricter
law will be no deterrent. Perhaps harsher law will bring wider
knowledge, and in turn more compliance. The penalty of for-
bidding set-off might seem justified as an additional penalty
for this purpose. But the law has not seen fit to penalize a
trustee who with equal or greater guilt and risk to the estate
has otherwise improperly invested. There are numerous cases
in which a trustee has misused funds-used them for his own
benefit in his business ;24 speculated on margin ;25 loaned without
security2 ' improperly delegated his duties to another;27 de-
posited money in his own bank account ;2S-all manners of im-
proper investments which afforded every degree of danger to
Babbitt v. Fidelity Trust Go., 72 N. J. Eq. 745, 66 At. 1076 (1907).
21Matter o1 Myers, 131 N. Y. 409, 30 N. E. 135 (1892); Faulkner v.
Hendy, 103 Cal. 15, 36 Pac. 1021 (1894).
0 English v. McIntyre, 29 N. Y. App. Div. 439 (1898).
"Roache's Estate, 5O Ore. 179, 92 Pac. 118 (1907).
2 Meck v. Behrens, 141 Wash. 676, 252 Pac. 91 (1927).
' Luke v. Kettenbach, 32 Ida. 191, 181 Pac. 705 (1919); Chancellor
v. Chancellor, 177 Ala. 44, 58 So. 423 (1912).
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the trust estate, yet the courts have not felt constrained to ap-
ply any penalty beyond holding the trustee liable for principal
and interest.
The inconsistency of the rule against set-off, based as it is
on the question of whether or not there were separate and dis-
tinct transactions, is brought out clearly in English y.
McIntyre,29 where the trustee improperly speculated on margin
with trust property. The court held that the purchases and
sales were not separate and distinct investments, and so profits
could be used to offset losses.30 Here the trustee multiplied
several times the risk over outright purchase, without penalty,
while the penalty attaches to outright purchase. The result
gives comparative immunity to this trustee and encourages
this more repugnant sort of misuse of trust funds. Favoring
such flagrant jeopardizing of trust funds finds little support in
public policy.
Perhaps the court realized that imposition of the penalty in
such a case might prove too onerous. A burden of similar pro-
portions could be accumulated if the trustee actively bought
and sold outright. Could he build up a liability greater in
amount than the misinvested fund, a liability greater than a
thief's?-there being no apparent limit to the rule's application.
In the cases of otbher improper investments, not only is there
no penalty, but no punitive rate of interest is charged, generally
four to six per cent, with occasionally a higher rate wh&re it is
felt that it had been earned by use of the trust money. Further,
commissions which are manifestly paid for the due execution of
the terms of the trust have not been denied,31 even in cases in
which no set-off was allowed.32 In the midst of such universally
tolerant treatment of the well-meaning trustee, the penalty of
the hypothetical case is anomalous.
Perhaps the insolvency of the trustee is not the only con-
tingency to be guarded against. For example, the helplessness
of the courts in the face of modern management and accounting
practice,33 or the problems of proof, may warrant a stricter ac-
" Supra, note 25.
Accord: Restatement of Trusts, sec. 204, comment I.
Babbitt v. Fidelity Trust Co., supra, note 23.
32 Gillespie v. Brooks, 2 Redf. Surr. (N. Y.) 349 (1876); King v.
Talbot, 40 N. Y. 76 (1869).
31See: Danielian, The Case of Associated Gas, Atlantic Monthly,
July 1933; Lowenthal: The Investor Pays, N. Y. 1933.
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countability to enable the courts to keep their grasp on an in-
stitution the integrity of which they seek to guard absolutely.
If so, apply a penalty, but one which aims at All acts endanger-
ing the trust, not one which reaches only the small and ill-defined
class 6f cases where improper investments are made in "distinct
transactions".
So far, the argument has attempted to discredit a holding
that contemporaneous purchases made by a trustee in good faith
and with reasonable care should be subject to the rule against
setting off gains against losses. The question then arises-in
what cases, if any, should the rule apply ! Certain distinctions
must be observed:
Transactions may be separate and distinct because:
1. They are made with properties belonging to different
trusts; or from the same trust, but under such circumstances
that transactions made at one time should not affect the status
of the trust at a former time, because, for example, there has
been in the meantime an accounting on which the beneficiary
has a right to rely, or the rights of third parties have intervened.
2. They involve the purchase of different securities, or the
same security bought from different parties.
3. They are made at different times.
The transactions may have been made by the trustee:
1. To benefit the estate, unknowingly in violation of some
duty imposed in maling investments.
2. With the intention of committing a breach of trust, but
without violating the duty of loyalty, solely in the interest of
the beneficiary.
3. To benefit the trustee, or to misappropriate trust prop-
erty.
It is perfectly clear that when a trustee makes improper in-
vestments with funds derived from two wholly unrelated trusts,
the outcome of the individual investments should have no effect
on each other. And in the course of the same trust, an account-
ing by the trustee may give the beneficiary such right to rely on
the assets of the trust, including the profits from improper in-
vestments, that the trustee should not be permitted to reduce
his liability for loss from subsequent improper investments by
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deducting profits made prior to the accounting. The decision
as to the remoteness of relation between trust funds is generally
not difficult to make, and of course where separate, no set-off
should be allowed.
When transactions arise in the investment of money out of
a single trust, but separate because several kinds of invest-
ments are made, as in the principal hypothetical case, it is sub-
mitted on the argument above, that set-off should be permitted,
regardless of the intention of the trustee. He is liable to ac-
count for what should have been; for the total net gain if any;
or for a surcharge for any net loss. That is the extent of his
liability if he had bought only one kind of equally bad stock,
or if with any amount of bad faith he had risked the trust fund
in numerous other ways. There seems to be no case holding a
thief for more.
Where, however, improper investments are made with in-
tervals of time, the motive and observance of the required duties
are to be considered in deciding on the application of the rule.
Keeping in view of the purpose of the law, to protect the trust
estate, we must apply the penalty where deterrence will pro-
tect the estate from risk. If at different times, with funds of
the same trust, the trustee improperly invests, acting reasonably
and honestly, he should be allowed to set offrthe gains and losses.
In ignorance of any wrongdoing, the stricter rule will do little
to forestall the risk to the trust. The acts are not more blame-
worthy than a commensurate single wrongful investment. And
this is not going as far as the English Statute of 1896 by which
the court could relieve the trustee of all liability-it leaves
him liable for the capital improperly invested, and interest..
An analogy for drawing the line at this point can be found
in the cases allowing or denying commissions to a trustee who
has acted in breach of trust. The line contended for does not
appear too liberal in comparison, for the penalty of withholding
commissions when the trustee has failed to perform .the work,
for which the cominission is compensation would seem rather
more than less -readily applied than the penalty of denial of
set-off. A recent New York case3 4 thus sums up the law on that
question:
3 Matter of Taft, 145 Misc. 435 (Surrogate's Court, King's County,
N. Y. 1932).
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"In an effort to ascertain the correct dividing line between conduct
which will warrant a denial of commissions and that which does not
justify such a course, an analysis of pertinent decisions has been
made by the court. This indicates that in all cases in which a denial
of commissions has been refused, the good faith of the fiduciary has
been demonstrated, and there has been an absence of conduct savoring
of extreme carelessness or neglect of duty. In other words, although
the conduct of the fiduciary may have been such as to entail loss to
the estate, for which he was surcharged, his error was one which did
not involve either intentional dereliction or wanton disregard of the
rights of persons primarily interested in the assets in his charge.
The specific instances of such conduct not deemed sufficient to justify
a denial involved an error in judgment in failing to institute action
on a note, failure to collect rents, and omission to pay a questioned
debt due the estate from himself. So, also, erroneous payments of
estate assets in good faith have been considered insufficient ground
for denial as have investments in legally unauthorized securities
(Morgan v. Morgan, 4 Dem. 353, 356; Gillespie v. Brooks, 2 Redf. 349,
368) and the omission to change non-legal into authorized invest-
ments (Matter of Mount, 2 Redf. 405). Other instances where the
conduct of the fiduciary has not been deemed such as to call for a
deprivation of the statutory recompense are the failure to apply for
a will construction and resulting continued retention of assets under
a dry trust in the honest belief that it was an active one; improper
makeup of accounts where no misconduct or dereliction was demon-
strated; the act of an ignorant woman in permitting her counsel to
manage the estate where no loss was shown; and suffering a dishonest
co-fiduciary whose embezzlements were made good to conduct the
affairs of the estate.
"Turning now to the cases in which commissions have been denied,
there is evident a tendency to deny the recompense even though the
financial damage to the estate has been repaired by the medium of a
surcharge where either positive mala fides has been demonstrated or
there has been long continued and striking disregard of fiduciary
duties . . . "
There is also express authority for the position advocated.
Where, up to a certain date, unauthorized dealings in real estate
had produced large profits, but similar dealings after that dqte
caused the loss of all the profits and some of the principal of the
fund, the court held that the cestui que trust had his election
to take the fund with legal interest, or the fund with all the
profits. But if he should elect to take the profits, he must take
them over the entire period, subject to all the losses.3 5 Similarly,
"Baker v. Disbrow, 18 Hun. 29, affd. 79 N. Y. 631 (1879):
"In such a case the rule seems to be that the cestui que trust has
his election to take the fund and legal interest thereon, or the fulid
and all the profits that has been made upon the. fund. If the cestui que
trust elects to take the profits he must take them during the whole
period, subject to all the losses of the business; he cannot take profits
for one period and interest for another. Hill on Trustees, 2nd Am. ed.
634; Perry, sees. 470-472; Heathcote v. Hulme. The trustee cannot be
charged with a greater amount of profits than he has actually received.
Jones v. Foxall, 15 Bear. 388, 395; Utica Ins. Co. v. Lynch, 11 Pal. 523
et seq. The principle is that, in the management of a trust, the trustee
may lose but cannot gain. If by any improper use of the fund, profits
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where speculative securities had been retained, and a later com-
mitment in bonds was made to protect some of them, the trustee
was held accountable only for the net profit, the court refusing
to "mUlct him in a large sum of money because of a technical
violation of the law, although the persons seeking thus to pen-
alize him have been by just such violation largely benefited.' ,36
" .. . In pursuing a settled and consistent policy, with reference
to the speculative securities of different kinds which came into his
possession, he acted with rare good judgment. Had he looked only to
his own protection from risk and a speedy settlement of the estate
and consequent shifting of responsibility from his shoulders, the
infants in whose behalf complaint is now being made would have
been deprived of the enormous advantages which have accrued from
his management. To permit a distributee to select an investment out
of others more fortunate, though the executor's conduct with reference
to all have been actuated from the same motives and in the exercise
of the same discretion, would be a gross injustice. It is a familiar
maxim that he who seeks equity must do equity, and infants are not
more relieved from this rule than adults. Upon a survey of the entire
administration of this accountant, I think that his judgment is to be
commended; that his good faith is beyond question; and still it is
seriously urged that I must, nevertheless, mulct him in a large sum
of money because of a technical violation of the law, although the
persons seeking thus to penalize him have been by such violation
largely benefited. Such a claim does not commend itself to my notions
of equity, and I refuse to give the support of my opinion to such con-
struction of the law." Lacey v. Davis, 5 Redf. Surr. (N. Y.) 301 (1882).
And where a business is improperly carried on by a trustee with
success for some years, but subsequently unprofitably, it is gen-
erally held that the beneficiaries. are not entitled to take the
profits earned during one period and hold the trustee liable for
the losses in another.
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have been realized, they must be accounted for, and if no profits have
been made he is to be charged with the fund and interest thereon. The
profits which may have accrued at any particular time are a mere
accretion to the fund, and the trustee can be charged with them only
upon the ground that he has appropriated them to his own use. If
upon an accounting, in respect to the fund during the entire period
of the trust, it appears that no profit has been made, the trustee is
chargeable with interest only. The improper investment is considered
as against the trustee himself, as equivalent to no investment. But in
favor of the cestui que trust it gives an option to claim either the in-
vestment made, or the replacement of the original fund, with interest,
according as the one or the other may be most for his benefit."
"IEstate of Porter, 5 N. Y. Misc. 274, 25 N. Y. S. 822 (1893):
3'Heathcote v. Hulme, 1 J. & W. 122 (1819); Small's Estate, 144
Pa. 293, 22 Atl. 809 (1891); Seguin's Appeal, 103 Pa. 139 (1883):
"The principles upon which profits made by the use of trust moneys
are ascertained and awarded, may be stated thus: Where a trustee
makes a profit off the trust fund, the cestui que trust may at his
election claim the profits so made, or interest at the legal rate upon
the amount so invested. When he elects to take- the profits he
can only claim the net result of the investment; he cannot claim
profits when profits are made and interest for the remainder of
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Where the trustee willfully misappropriates trust property
or risks it for his own benefit, as in the ease of an attempt to
escape a liability from a loss previously incurred through a
breach of trust, by a subsequent gamble, the law cannot tolerate
a benefit to the trustee. To deter the act, the law must prevent
any profit from it. The soluiion is to isolate the transaction,
divert any profit therefrom to the trust, and hold the trustee
liable for any loss. So, also, where the trustee has made a profit
by an unauthorized investment, and willfully risks it, knowingly
violating his duty of care, he should be liable for any loss on
the second transaction.
More doubtful may be the solution when a trustee acts
knowingly 'beyond the terms of the trust, but entirely in good
faith to benefit the beneficiary. However, the policy of the fore-
going paragraph would seem to apply equally to this class of
cases. It is not unfair to put 'the risk on the trustee who is
aware of going beyond his power. He assumes the risk, and the
risk should increase with each extension of wrongful commitment
of trust property.
An allied problem arises when a trustee has made a profit
on an authorized investment, a loss on an unauthorized one. So
long as one holds to the established rule that a trustee is liable
the time. The reason for this is that he is only entitled to profits on
the footing that he sanctions, approves of, and adopts the investment
of the trustee as his own. He has his option to say all investments of
the trust fund are in contemplation of law made for my benefit, and
belong to me with their legitimate fruits, in which case he must take
them just as they are; or he may say, you had no right to invest the
funds in that way, and I refuse to accept the investment or to ratify
what you have done. If he adopts the latter course, the trustee, not
having invested according to the law, must account for the principal
and also for the interest which he ought to have made by a proper
investment, and which the law therefore presumes he has made, and
charges him with, namely, six per cent, and no more. If the cestui
que trust adopts the investment, he is bound by its terms. He rati-
fies and adopts the acts of his trustee. He simply steps into his shoes,
and is entitled to nothing but what the trustee has received or would
receive if the funds had been his own. Having ratified and adopted
the acts of the trustee, all questions as to the legality or propriefy of
such acts are laid at rest. The trustee will then be allowed his com-
missions as though the investment had been a strictly legal one.
Rapalie v. Halt, 1 Sanford's Ch. R. N. Y. 399. When a trustee makes an
illegal investment nothing can be imposed on him by way of punish-
ment, for, inasmuch as he would be liable for the principal and interest
if he dishonestly appropriated the money to his personal use, it would
be inequitable to inflict an additional penalty where he merely made
an irregular, but it may be, a well-meant or even a judicious invest-
ment."
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for losses from unauthorized investments, it does not seem
feasible to let him. escape liability by decreasing that loss- by
pointing to a profit made on an authorized investment. This
improper investment is viewed as a thing apart, and even though
the purpose of the law is only to secure to the trust the principal
fund, the strong tendency to hold the trustee for losses from
improper investments prompts the feeling that even a fortui-
tous profit belonging to the estate should not be detracted from
because of the trustee's default.38 If we should depart from the
rule of strict liability for loss from improper investments, as
by the English Statute, if the trustee acted honestly and reason-
ably, there would be no need of set-off as he might be relieved of
liability, profit or no profit on the proper investment. But
apart from such slackening of the rules, his liability would be
unabated.
It may then be argued, that, the worse a trustee is, the
better off; for if the former investment, X, had been improper
and was profitable, he could set off that gain against the loss on
the subsequent improper one, Y, but not if X had been proper.
True in that case, he would be better off. 'But of course, if X had
shown a loss he would have suffered a greater liability. While
in the ultimate result of a single case, as where X appreciates,
Y depreciates, the liability of the more righteous trustee is
greater," the picture should be viewed from the time the two in-
vestments are made. At that time, on the average the liability of
loss to the more transgressing trustee is higher.3 9
18 See: Murphy-Botanz Land and Loan Co. v. McKibben, 236 S. W.
78 (Tex. Com. ADD. 1922); Contra: Fletcher v. Green, 33 Beav. 426
(1864).
= To illustrate: A makes two investments of $100 each, in X and Y.
We will assume that each fluctuates equally in a range from $75 to
$125; that X is an improper investment; and will calculate A's liabili-
ties in nine contingent relationships that fluctuations may cause, when
Y is a proper investment, and when an improper one:-
LIABILITY OF TRUSTEE
X, improper Y If Y proper If Y improper
125 125 0 0
125 100 0 0
125 75 0 0
100 125 0 0
100 100 0 0
100 75 0 25
75 125 25 0
75 100 25 25
75 75 25 50
TOTAL 75 100
